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Abstract—We propose a new scheme to enhance the physical-
layer security of wireless single-input single-output orthogonal-
frequency division-multiplexing (OFDM) transmissions from an
electric vehicle, Alice, to the aggregator, Bob, in the presence of an
eavesdropper, Eve. To prevent information leakage to Eve, Alice
exploits the wireless channel randomness to extract secret key
symbols that are used to encrypt some data symbols which are
then multiplexed in the frequency domain with the remaining un-
encrypted data symbols. To secure the unencrypted data symbols,
Alice transmits an artificial-noise (AN) signal superimposed over
her data signal. We propose a three-level optimization procedure
to increase the average secrecy rate of this wiretap channel by
optimizing the transmit power allocation between the encrypted
data symbols, unencrypted data symbols and the AN symbols.
Our numerical results show that the proposed scheme achieves
considerable secrecy rate gains compared to the benchmark cases.
Index Terms—Artificial noise, OFDM, secret key, security,
wiretap channel
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid (SG) enables two-way communications
between the utility and the customers (e.g., electric vehicles
(EVs), houses). This provides means for data exchange in ad-
dition to energy exchange between the utility and consumers.
The EVs are connected to the SG for energy charging and
discharging, where EVs can buy and sell energy from/to the
grid. Although vehicle-to-grid (V2G) connection reduces the
power outage possibilities and can help the utility when EVs
sell their energies to the grid, the connection introduces new
challenges in terms of security since the privacy and security
of EVs’ owners are vulnerable to eavesdropping. Since an
eavesdropping node can extract the identity, activity status, and
data of the transmitting devices, it is very crucial to protect
the communications systems against such attacks [1], [2].
Securing data transmissions at the physical layer (PHY)
using information-theoretic approaches, commonly known as
PHY security, was first characterized in the seminal work of
Wyner [3]. The secrecy capacity of the link connecting two
nodes in a shared medium represents the highest data rate
that can be transferred reliably between the legitimate nodes
without any information leakage to the eavesdroppers. Hence,
in addition to cyber security issues that have been investigated
extensively [1], [2], it is critical to investigate the PHY security
of wireless V2G communications [4]. In fact, a wireless node
with an off-the-shelf radio module can send and receive radio-
frequency (RF) signals as well as freely overhear the ongoing
communications within radio range. Hence, an adversary,
which can be any nearby node, can eavesdrop on the com-
munications between the legitimate EVs and the aggregators
or the communications between the aggregators and the utility.
This adversary can obtain confidential information about the
EVs and the utility. Therefore for a secure EV network design,
This work is supported by Hyundai Inc.
all potential risks should be considered and new schemes
should be designed for secure deployments of wireless V2G
networks. Accordingly, in this paper, we propose new ro-
bust schemes to ensure secure communications against PHY
eavesdropping attacks for wireless single-input single-output
(SISO) orthogonal-frequency division-multiplexing (OFDM)
transmissions.
Due to its high performance over frequency-selective chan-
nels, OFDM transceivers have been widely deployed in both
wired and wireless networks. Hence, investigating the security
of OFDM systems is crucial. In [5], Li et al. investigated the
secrecy capacity of OFDM-based wireless networks. To sim-
plify the system’s design, Rodrigues et al. [6] proposed a low-
complexity but insecure metric (from information-theoretic
perspective) to study the security of a wiretap channel where
the authors defined the system’s security as the lower-bound on
the minimum mean squared error of the decoded data symbols
at the eavesdropping node.
To increase the achievable secrecy rates, spatial artificial-
noise (S-AN) injection has been widely investigated in various
network settings [7]–[11] while temporal-AN (T-AN) injection
for OFDM systems has been recently investigated in [12].
For example, in [8], Tsai and Poor proposed power-allocation
schemes for data precoded transmissions aided with precoded
S-AN. In [12], Qin et al. proposed a new scheme for securing
OFDM systems using T-AN for the single-input single-output
single-antenna eavesdropper (SISOSE) system. In the T-AN
scheme, the cyclic prefix (CP) sequence provides extra tem-
poral degrees of freedom that can be exploited to transmit
a precoded time-domain AN vector superimposed over the
information vector. The problem was directly extended in
[13]. In [14], El Shafie et al. proposed a new hybrid S-
AN/T-AN scheme and investigated its impact on the average
secrecy rate of of the multiple-input multiple-output multi-
antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME)-OFDM systems. In [15],
the authors revisited the SISO-OFDM system and showed that
the number of useful T-AN streams depends on the maximum
of the delay spreads of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links.
Another approach for PHY security is based on exploiting
the randomness of the wireless channel for secret key gen-
eration (SKG). Wireless channels are typically reciprocal at
a given carrier frequency. That is, at any instant in time, the
multi-path properties are identical in both directions of the link
between the transmitter and receiver. Temporal variations of
fading channels are a source of randomness that can be mea-
sured at both ends of a communication link from which a pair
of identical secret keys can be extracted. Secret key extraction
and generation from wireless channel measurements has been
realized using different properties of the received signal, e.g.,
received signal strength (RSS) [16], phase differences [17],
time delay (in wideband transmission) [18], [19], and channel
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state information (CSI) [20]. Since RSS is easy to measure
in practice, it is often used in many scenarios (see, e.g. [16]).
Upon agreeing on a secure key between the legitimate partners,
it can be used once as a one-time pad (OTP) to encrypt several
data symbols. OTP encryption is perfectly secure and provably
unbreakable as long as the number of secured data symbols are
equal to the number of secret key symbols [21]. Unfortunately,
the main restriction of OTP encryption is that the number
of secure key symbols is too low [20], [22]–[24] to encrypt
all the transmitted data symbols. This is because the channel
reciprocity property can not be guaranteed unless Alice and
Bob measure the channel simultaneously. Moreover, perfect
independence between the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links is
not possible in some scenarios. Increasing the number of secret
key symbols has been investigated in many works, e.g., [20],
[22]–[24] and the references therein.
Our main contributions in this paper are summarized as
follows. Without Eve’s instantaneous CSI knowledge at Alice,
we propose a new joint T-AN/SK scheme with a three-level
optimization approach to increase the average secrecy rate. The
data symbols’s power levels are optimized based on the rate of
the Alice-Bob channel. In addition, we formulate a constrained
optimization problem to maximize the average secrecy rate
under a total transmit power constraint at Alice. Hence, we
optimize the fraction of transmit power assigned to encrypted
data, unencrypted data and AN symbols.
Notation: Lower- and upper-case bold letters denote vectors
and matrices, respectively. IN and F denote theN×N identity
matrix and the N × N fast Fourier transform (FFT) matrix,
respectively. CM×N denotes the set of all complex matrices
of size M ×N . (·) and (·)∗ denote transpose and Hermitian
(i.e., complex-conjugate transpose) operations, respectively. |·|
cardinality of a set. RM×N denotes the set of real matrices of
size M ×N . E{·} denotes statistical expectation. [A]k,1:N is
the k-th row of the matrixA ∈ CM×N . 0M×N denotes the all-
zero matrix with size M ×N . diag = {·} denotes a diagonal
matrix with the enclosed elements as its diagonal elements.
CN (x, y) denotes a complex circularly-symmetric Gaussian
random variable with mean x and variance y. [·]+ = max{0, ·}
returns the maximum between the argument and zero.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND TEMPORAL AN DESIGN
In this section, we state our main assumptions and then
explain the design of the proposed AN precoding matrix.
A. System Model and Assumptions
We investigate the SISO-OFDM wiretap channel scenario
where all the wireless nodes are equipped with a single
antenna. A legitimate EV (Alice) transmits her confidential
messages to a legitimate receiver (i.e., the data aggregator),
which we refer to as Bob, in the presence of a passive
eavesdropping node (Eve). Eve can be one of the other
EVs or an external wireless adversary. We study the possi-
ble eavesdropping attacks when an EV communicates with
the aggregator. Since Eve is assumed to be passive during
the communications between Alice and Bob, her CSI is
unknown at Alice. Alice transmits her data using OFDM
with N sub-channels. At the beginning of each OFDM block
of size N sub-channels, a CP of size Ncp is inserted in
the time domain using the CP insertion matrix, denoted by
Tcp ∈ R(N+Ncp)×N . Prior to information decoding, the CP
is removed at the receiver using the CP removal matrix,
denoted by Rcp =
[
0N×NcpIN
] ∈ RN×(N+Ncp). The main
purpose of the CP sequence is to eliminate the inter-block
interference and to convert the Toeplitz channel matrix into
a circulant one which simplifies the decoding complexity at
the receiver. Let LB and LE denote the delay spreads (i.e.,
channel memories) of both Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links,
respectively. We assume a block-fading channel model where
the channel coefficients of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links
remain unchanged during the coherence time duraion which is
sufficient for the transmissions of several OFDM blocks. The
channel coefficients change randomly and independently from
one coherence time to another. Each tap of the channel impulse
response (CIR) of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links is a
complex zero-mean circularly-symmetric Gaussian random
variable with variance σ2A−B and σ
2
A−E, respectively. The CP
is designed to be longer than the channel memories of both the
Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links. Let nB and nE denote the zero
mean circularly-symmetric complex-additive Gaussian white
noise (AWGN) at Bob and Eve, respectively. Let κB and κE
denote the noise variances of the receivers at Bob and Eve,
respectively. Hence, for a per sub-channel bandwidth of Δf ,
the noise power per sub-channel at Bob and Eve receivers are
ηB = κBΔf and ηE = κEΔf , respectively.
Let Htime ∈ C(N+Ncp)×(N+Ncp) and Gtime ∈
C(N+Ncp)×(N+Ncp) denote the complex time-domain chan-
nel matrices of the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links, re-
spectively. Htime is a lower-triangular Toeplitz matrix with
[htime(0), htime(1), . . . , htime(LB), 0, . . . , 0]
 as its first col-
umn where htime(i) is the i-th tap of the Alice-Bob link
CIR. Gtime can be represented with a similar lower-triangular
Toeplitz channel matrix with (LE+1) channel taps. Let H =
FRcpHtimeTcpF∗ ∈ CN×N and G = FRcpGtimeTcpF∗ ∈
CN×N denote the corresponding frequency-domain complex
diagonal channel coefficients of Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve
links, respectively. Px = diag(px1 , px2 , · · · , pxN ) is a di-
agonal power matrix containing the transmit power levels at
each sub-channel, and x denotes the N × 1 independent data
symbols with zero mean and unit variance.
Our proposed PHY security scheme is as summarized as
follows. Alice and Bob use the proposed SKG techniques in
[20], [24]. That is, Alice and Bob exchange training signals
and estimate their channels. Then, they form a common secret
key consisting of a limited number of bits, with which Alice
encrypts none, some, or all of the data symbols using an
OTP.1 In general, the secret key rates are low compared to the
achievable data rates. Hence, we focus on the case where only
a portion of the data symbols (i.e., OFDM sub-channels) can
1The SKG process is beyond the scope of this paper. SKG algorithms for
fading channels under OFDM transmissions are given in [20], [24], where
Alice and Bob 1) exchange a known training sequence and measure the
channel output, 2) employ error correction techniques to reconcile discrepan-
cies between the measurements/generated secret keys, and 3) perform privacy
amplification [25], [26] through one-way hash functions to ensure that Eve
does not know the final secret key.
be encrypted using the extracted secret keys. The encrypted
symbols are multiplexed in the frequency domain with the
remaining unencrypted data symbols. After that, AN symbols
are added to the entire OFDM block in the time domain to
secure the unencrypted data symbols. Since Bob has the secret
key symbols, he can decrypt the encrypted sub-channels and
process both encrypted and unencrypted sub-channels. On the
other hand, Eve does not have the secret keys to decrypt the
encrypted sub-channels and after decoding the unencrypted
sub-channels, her signal will be degraded by the T-AN signal.
We assume that Alice communicates her data to Bob using
a set of constellation points S that approximates a Gaussian
input scheme [26]. Alice and Bob begin by estimating the CIR
of their link and agreeing on a secret key r ∈ [r1, r2, · · · , rNe ],
with ri ∈ S using any of the approaches in, e.g., [20],
[24] and the references therein. Eve is assumed sufficiently
distant from both Alice and Bob such that her probability of
obtaining the secret key is very low. Once a secure key has
been agreed upon, it can be used as an OTP to encrypt the data
transmissions. The OTP key r ensures a one-to-one mapping
from the unencrypted data symbol, ai to the encrypted data
symbol, a˜i, given the secret key symbol, ri. The security is
unbreakable since each secret key symbol ri is uniformly
distributed over S. Hence, no information is leaked to any
eavesdropping node that intercepts the encrypted data symbols.
B. Design of the Temporal AN Precoding Matrix
Since the encrypted sub-channels are secured using keys,
the purpose of the T-AN is to secure the unencrypted sub-
channels. The T-AN scheme improves the PHY security of
the OFDM transmissions by sacrificing a portion of Alice’s
transmit power to transmit AN vectors to degrade Eve’s
received signal. The T-AN is injected in the time domain to
exploit the temporal degrees of freedom provided by the CP.
The precoding matrix, Q ∈ C(N+Ncp)×Ncp , designs the AN
to span the null space of the channel matrix between Alice
and Bob as follows
RcpHtimeQ = 0 (1)
The wide matrix RcpHtime ∈ CN×(N+Ncp) has a null space
of size Ncp columns. Let z ∼ CN (0,Σz) denote the Ncp× 1
AN symbols transmitted to confuse Eve with Ncp streams and
let Σz denote the AN covariance matrix. The received signals
at Bob and Eve can be, respectively, expressed as
yB = HP
1
2 x+ nB (2)
yE = GP
1
2 x+ FRcpGtimeQz+ nE (3)
III. ACHIEVABLE RATES AND OPTIMIZATION
We propose a three-level optimization technique for the
power allocation to increase the average secrecy rate. At the
first optimization level, Alice determines the active OFDM
sub-channels using the water-filling algorithm as in, e.g.,
[27] and the references therein. Then, at the second level,
Alice optimizes the instantaneous power allocated to each
data symbol using the water filling algorithm for each type of
data (i.e., encrypted and unencrypted). The reason for these
two levels of optimization is that, since Alice does not have
any knowledge about Eve’s instantaneous CSI, Alice can only
optimize her transmit power levels across the OFDM sub-
channels to maximize the rate of her own link (i.e. Alice-
Bob link). Hence, Alice performs the water-filling algorithm
to maximize her transmission rate. After that, at the third level,
Alice optimizes the transmit power fraction assigned to AN,
encrypted data, and unencrypted data based on the average
secrecy rate, which can be computed since Eve’s channel
statistics are assumed to be known at Alice. Assuming that
the total transmit power is P , let θ = [θ1, θ2, θ3] denote the
vector of power fractions, where a fraction θ1 is assigned to
encrypted data, a fraction θ2 is assigned to unencrypted data,
and a fraction θ3 = 1−θ1−θ2 is assigned to AN. This efficient
design will lead to a simple 2-dimensional optimization over
θ1 and θ2 to maximize the average secrecy rate.
We assume that both Bob and Eve know the indices of
the encrypted and the unencrypted sub-channels in every
OFDM block. Since GP
1
2 is diagonal, Eve can select the sub-
channels containing the unencrypted data symbols and decode
them jointly. Hence, Eve’s received signal after removing the
encrypted data sub-channels is given by
CueyE = CueGP
1
2x+CueFR
cpGtimeQz+CuenE (4)
whereCue ∈ RNue×N is a matrix that extracts the unencrypted
OFDM sub-channels whose number is Nue. The power of each
AN symbol is pz = θ3PLu . Hence, the achievable rate of the
Alice-Eve link is given by
RE=log2 det
(
INue+CueGPG
∗C∗ue
(
θ3P Q˜Q˜
∗
Lu
+ηEINue
)−1)
(5)
where Q˜ = AueFRcpGtimeQ with Aue denoting a ma-
trix that extracts the non-zero power unencrypted data sub-
channels out of all data sub-channels2 and P is the power
diagonal matrix of the data symbols.
Remark 1. The expression in (5) assumes that Eve knows the
AN precoding matrixQ, which is a best-case scenario for Eve.
Given that the null space of a matrix can be obtained from
the singular value decomposition (SVD) of that matrix (i.e.,
by selecting the right singular vectors corresponding to zero
singular values), knowledge of the AN precoding matrix Q
may imply that Eve knows some information about the channel
matrix between Alice and Bob. This, in turn, might sacrifice the
key’s security which is based on the CSI of the Alice-Bob link.
However, as was shown in Lemma 1 of [26], the right singular
vectors of a random matrix do not reveal any information
about the matrix itself. Hence, even when Eve knows the AN
precoding matrix, she does not know the matrix itself and this
information does not reveal additional correlated information
about the CSI of the Alice-Bob link. We can therefore assume
that Eve has full knowledge of the null space matrix without
compromising the information-theoretic security.
2The reason of multiplying the interference matrix at Eve, FRcpGtimeQ,
byAue is that after performing the power allocation, some of the unencrypted
sub-channels will have zero power. Hence, due to the decoupled nature of
the OFDM sub-channels, Eve and Bob will not process those sub-channels.
Accordingly, Eve needs to drop those sub-channels prior to performing the
joint sub-channels (i.e., maximum likelihood (ML)) decoding.
The achievable rate of the Alice-Bob link is given by
RB =
∑
k∈E
log2
(
1 +
pk
ηB
|Hk|2
)
+
∑
k∈U
log2
(
1 +
pk
ηB
|Hk|2
)
(6)
where E (U) denotes the set of encrypted (unencrypted) sub-
channels. The expression in (6) is composed of two terms. The
first term is perfectly secured due to encryption using the secret
keys while the second term is unsecured and its security should
be measured using the secrecy rate. Hence, the instantaneous
secrecy rate of the legitimate system is given by
Rsec=
∑
k∈E
log2
(
1+
pk
ηB
|Hk|2
)
+
[∑
k∈U
log2
(
1+
pk
ηB
|Hk|2
)
−log2 det
(
INue+CueGPG
∗C∗ue
(
θ3P
Ncp
Q˜Q˜∗+ηEINue
)−1)]+
(7)
We notice that, unlike the conventional PHY security schemes,
our proposed scheme has a positive secrecy rate due to the use
of the secret keys, given by
∑
k∈E log2
(
1 + pkηB |Hk|2
)
.
Next, we explain the proposed optimization levels.
A. Selection of Active Sub-channels
Assuming that the channel gains of the Alice-Bob link in the
frequency domain are ordered such that the sub-channel with
the highest gain is denoted by |H1|2 and that with the lowest
gain is |HN |2, we use Algorithm 1 below to determine the
active OFDM sub-channels. The algorithm is realized using
the total power assigned to data transmission given by (θ1 +
θ2)P .
Algorithm 1 Active Sub-channels
1: Initialize N = N .
2: Order the instantaneous gains of all sub-channels.
3: Compute C = (θ1+θ2)P
N
+ 1
N
∑N
k=1
ηB
|Hk|2 .
4: Compute Ek = C − ηB|Hk|2 ; k = 1, 2, · · · , N .
5: If Ek ≤ 0, remove that sub-channel (should be one with
highest index since it has lower gain and SNR).
6: Set Nold = N .
7: Set Nnew = N − number of removed sub-channels.
8: If Nnew = Nold, N = Nnew and go back to step (3).
9: If Nold = Nnew, |A| = Nnew and the active set A has
been constructed.
B. Optimizing the Sub-channels’ Power Levels
After determining the set of active sub-channels, denoted
by A, Alice encrypts Ne sub-channels of them using the
available secret keys symbols and the remaining sub-channels
are left unencrypted. Assume that the set of encrypted sub-
channels is E and the set of unencrypted sub-channels is
U . To obtain the power levels for the encrypted and the
unencrypted sub-channels, Alice solves the following two
constrained optimization problems,
max :
pk,∀k∈E
∑
k∈E
log2
(
1 +
pk
κB
|Hk|2
)
, s.t. 0 ≤
∑
k∈U
pk ≤ θ1P (8)
and
max :
pj ,∀j∈U
∑
j∈U
log2
(
1 +
pj
κB
|Hj |2
)
, s.t. 0 ≤
∑
j∈U
pj ≤ θ2P (9)
The optimal power assignment for each optimization problem
is a well-known water-filling approach [28].
C. Maximizing the Average Secrecy Rate
Assuming the knowledge of the statistics of Eve’s channel
at Alice, the average secrecy rate can be calculated and we
can state the following optimization problem to obtain θ1 and
θ2 that maximize the average secrecy rate
max :
θ1,θ2
E{Rsec}, s.t. θ1 ≥ 0, θ2 ≥ 0, θ1 + θ2 ≤ 1 (10)
A simple method to obtain the optimal solution of the two
optimization parameters that maximizes the average secrecy
rate is to divide the range of each optimization variable, which
spans from 0 to 1, into M equally-spaced grid points, and
then evaluate the objective function M
2
2 times since we have
2 optimization variables. The 12 term is due to the constraint
θ1 + θ2 ≤ 1. The optimal solution is the one that yields the
highest objective function in (10). Our proposed approach is
summarized in Algorithm 2. Although these computations are
performed offline and infrequently, their complexity can be
reduced by using alternative computationally-efficient methods
such as the interior-point method [29, Chapter 11].
Algorithm 2 Optimization Procedure
1: Select a large number K
2: loop1:
3: Generate 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ θ2 ≤ 1
4: Compute θ3 = 1− θ1 − θ2
5: Set i = 1
6: loop2: while i = K
7: Generate channel realizations using the channel statistics
8: For the given channel realization, Solve (8) and (9)
9: Compute Rsec using (7)
10: Set z(i) = Rsec
11: Set i = i+ 1
12: goto loop2.
13: endwhile;
14: Compute the average secrecy rate E{Rsec} using
∑K
i=1 z(i)
K
15: goto loop1.
16: Select θ1 and θ2 that maximize E{Rsec}
D. Per Sub-channel Processing at Eve
Under per sub-channel processing, Eve decodes each
OFDM sub-channel individually. Hence, the received signal
at Eve per sub-channel k is given by
yE,k = Gk
√
pkxk + [FR
cpGtimeQ]k,1:Ncpz+ nE,k (11)
where yE,k is the k-th element of yE, [FRcpGtimeQ]k,1:Ncp
is the k-th row of FRcpGtimeQ, and nE,k is the k-th element
of nE. The T-AN power on the i-th data sub-channel is given
by, ηi = θ3PNcp [Q˜Q˜
∗]i,1:N . The achievable rate of the Alice-Eve
rate under the per sub-channel processing is given by
RE=
∑
i∈U
log2
(
1 +
|Gi|2pi
ηi + ηE
)
(12)
which suggests that all OFDM sub-channels will be degraded
by the AN signal and the correlation of the AN signal
across the data sub-channels is not exploited. This degrades
Eve’s instantaneous rate significantly unlike the joint OFDM
sub-channels processing case. The achievable instantaneous
secrecy rate is thus given by
Rsec=
∑
k∈E
log2
(
1+
|Hk|2pk
ηB
)
+
[∑
i∈U
log2
(
1+
|Hi|2pi
ηB
)
−
∑
i∈U
log2
(
1+
|Gi|2pi
ηi+ηE
)]+ (13)
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The parameters used to generate the figures are: N = 64,
LB = LE = L = Ncp = 16, a uniform CIR power delay
profile with σ2A−B = σ
2
A−E = 1/(L+1), ηB = ηE = κΔf = 0
dB and SNR = 30 dB per OFDM sub-channel. The average
secrecy rates are plotted in bits/sec/Hz. Therefore, all rate-
expressions derived in the previous sections are divided by
(N +Ncp) to convert their units from bits/OFDM block into
bits/sec/Hz. Fig. 1 shows the average secrecy rates versus the
number of encrypted sub-channels while Eve performs the
conventional per sub-channel decoding or the high-complexity
joint sub-channels decoding. In the joint decoding case, Eve
exploits the T-AN correlation among the OFDM sub-carriers.
Hence, the average secrecy rate is reduced significantly for low
and moderate numbers of encrypted sub-channels. This shows
that the effectiveness of the T-AN-only scheme (corresponding
to the case when Ne = 0) is reduced significantly when Eve
performs joint OFDM sub-channels decoding. The proposed
hybrid T-AN/SK-aided scheme enhances the security for both
decoding scenarios as Ne increases. In all the following
figures, we consider the best-case scenario for Eve where joint
sub-channels decoding is performed.
In Fig. 2, we demonstrate that the average secrecy rate
is monotonically increasing with the number of encrypted
OFDM sub-channels when the transmit power is allocated
equally among the data OFDM sub-channels. Three methods
are used to select the encrypted OFDM sub-channels. In
the first method, we encrypt the Ne sub-channels with the
highest instantaneous Bob channel gains among the active sub-
channels. In the second method, the Ne sub-channels with
the lowest instantaneous Bob channel gains among the active
sub-channels are encrypted. In the third method, Alice simply
encrypts random Ne sub-channels among the active ones. As
depicted in Fig. 2, the three methods achieve similar average
secrecy rates. The first method enhances the first term of the
secrecy rate in Eqn. (13) (encrypted rate) at the expense of
the second term (unencrypted rate) in contrast to the second
method. The third method balances between the two terms.
That is why, on average, the three methods achieve similar
performance.
In Fig. 3, the performance of the T-AN only, SK-aided only
and the hybrid T-AN/SK-aided schemes are evaluated. We
show that without AN and secret keys, the average secrecy
rate is close to zero. This is because the average rates of
the Alice-Bob link and the Alice-Eve link are equal. The
performance of the T-AN only scheme is close to 1 bit/sec/Hz
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Fig. 1: Achieved average secrecy rate when Eve performs joint
and per sub-channel processing.
as Eve performs joint OFDM sub-channels decoding. The SK-
aided without the AN scheme has low performance when Ne
is small and the performance is enhanced with increasing Ne.
The hybrid AN/SK-aided scheme combines the benefits of
both schemes where the AN impact results in an upward shift
and the performance is enhanced with increasing Ne until
the point where all the OFDM sub-channels are encrypted
and the achievable rate is the Alice-Bob link rate, which is
the same as the case of no eavesdropping. Two scenarios are
considered for selecting the power fractions in AN/SK-aided
scheme. We observe that Algorithm 2 outperforms the fixed
power fraction allocation scheme since it optimizes the power
levels according to the number of encrypted sub-channels.
In Fig. 4, we investigate the impact of θ1 and its optimal
value for a fixed θ3 on the average secrecy rate. We notice
that as Ne increases, the optimal θ1 moves toward 1. This
implies that most of the transmit power will be assigned to
the encrypted data. On the other hand, when Ne is small, the
optimal values moves toward 1/2 because it is more secure to
assign more power to the unencrypted data which is protected
by the AN. However, in general, we have a set of optimal θ1
(and hence a set of optimal θ2 = 1− θ1 − θ3) which achieves
almost the same average secrecy rate.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We showed that using secret keys, generated from the chan-
nel randomness, to encrypt some data sub-channels can effi-
ciently increase the average secrecy rate of OFDM transmis-
sions. We showed that the T-AN only scheme performance is
degraded significantly when Eve performs joint sub-channels
decoding. Our proposed hybrid T-AN/SK-aided scheme en-
hances the average secrecy rate for both per sub-channel and
joint sub-channels decoding strategies at Eve. We proposed a
three-level optimization algorithm for optimizing the transmit
power distribution between encrypted, unencrypted and T-
AN symbols which achieves considerable secrecy rate gains
compared to other power allocation strategies. We showed
that even without knowledge of Eve’s instantaneous CSI, the
instantaneous rate of the Alice-Bob channel can be achieved,
which is the highest possible secrecy rate, as the number of
encrypted data symbols increases.
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